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I. Introduction
The impact of increased openness to trade, financial flows and foreign direct investment
on the distribution of costs and benefits from globalization remains a controversial and poorly
understood subject, despite an enormous amount of research undertaken by economists and other
social scientists in recent years.(See, Baker, Epstein, Pollin, 1998; Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 1995 for recent discussions of many of these issues). Among the most important
and most studied issues is the impact of globalization on inequality and the related issue of the
impact of globalization on the roles governments choose to play and on their ability to achieve
their goals.
Most of the literature on the impact of globalization on inequality has tried to explain the
increased inequality among groups of workers, and has focused on the impacts of trade in goods
and services on this intra-worker inequality. (See Cline, 1997 for a recent survey of this vast
literature.)1 This research has been developed by two groups of economists: labor economists,
who have attempted to measure the impact of trade by looking at the size of trade flows
(quantities) and trade economists who, using the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, have looked at the
impact of price changes in traded goods on income distributions.(see Cline, 1997; and Collins,
1998). A “consenus” of sorts has emerged among mainstream economists concerning these
issues: in the case of the U.S., and Europe, trade can explain at most about 10-20% of the
increase in inequality between college educated and non-college educated workers. According to
this assessment, the quantity flows and price changes are simply too small to explain more.2
What motivates our current work is the belief that this literature has looked at the
connection between globalization and inequality in a narrow and therefore potentially misleading
way. In particular, by focusing almost exclusively on trade it has virtually ignored a crucial
aspect of globalization – capital flows; and by focusing on wage inequality, it has mostly ignored
the increasing inequality between workers and capitalists. This is puzzling especially since the
major trade theorems connected to inequality, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, concerns the
impact of trade on the distribution of income between wages and profits.
Our work on threat effects is motivated by the belief that a focus on capital mobility and
the distribution of income between labor and capital may help to bridge the gap between the
widely-held perception that globalization is having a big impact on the distribution of income,
wealth and power, on the one hand, and the results delivered by economics research, on the
other.
While the impact of international portfolio flows on the macroeconomy is substantial, the
focus of this paper is on the international operations of multinational corporations (MNC’s).
When economists discuss MNC’s, they usually focus on foreign direct investment (FDI). But
such a focus is misleading: MNC’s operate in a variety of ways, only some of which involve
FDI. They also engage in sub-contracting – hiring another firm to produce output, such as Nike
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hiring a firm in Asia to produce its shoes; outsourcing – that is importing intermediate inputs
from a foreign supplier, including but not restricted to its own affiliates abroad; engaging in
joint-ventures where the arrangement does not involve an equity investment. A major difficulty
in analyzing the impact of MNC’s is the lack of good data on these non-equity arrangements.
The effect of MNC’s on income distribution, while studied quite intensively in the
1960's and 1970's, (see, for example Bergsten, et. al., 1978) has not received the same attention
more recently.3 Superficially at least there may be good reason for the relative lack of research
on multinational corporations and foreign direct investment as an explanation for rising
inequality and /or unemployment. First, most discussions of multinational corporations focus on
data of foreign direct investment, (FDI)since data on other aspects of their operations –
outsourcing and sub-contracting – are more difficult to find4. And as these data show, most FDI
is between the richer countries of the “north” rather than from north to south. Table 1 shows, for
example, that in 1997, 61% of the inward stock of FDI was in developed countries, while 90%
of the FDI was from developed economies. Furthermore, as implied by these data, there is a also
a great deal of “two-way” flows between the developed countries. So the net flows of FDI in
general, and from high wage and to low wage countries in particular appear, on the surface at
least, to be much less important than manufacturing imports from low wage countries.
In this paper I argue that this sort of reasoning may be misleading. The ability of
multinational corporations to shift production elsewhere – to a different country or even to a
different state – may enhance the bargaining power of firms relative to workers, even if the costs
the firms find when they get there are similar to those prevailing at home. This improvement in
“exit options” may therefore, all else equal, reduce wage and/or employment outcomes for
workers, even in the absence of substantial net capital flows, or even large gross flows (Crotty,
Epstein, Kelly, 1998; Rodrik, 1999).
Another way to put this is that the mere threat of moving a factory to a different location
may have a significant impact on wages or institutional variables such as unionization rates, even
in the absence of any movement by companies. These threats may generate a magnification
effect of the impact of flows on inequality and government behavior in the sense that the impact
of openness may be larger than may be attributed to the flows of goods, services or capital
themselves.
For example, in a survey taken in the U.S. covering the period 1993-1995,
Bronfenbrenner (1996), showed that 50% of all firms in general and 65% of manufacturing firms
in particular who were targets of union organizing campaigns threatened to close down and
move if their workers unionized. Though only 12% of those firms that were unionized
subsequently shut down, workers evidently found the threats credible: where threats were made,
unions lost a larger percent of elections. (See below for more discussion of Bronfenbrenner’s
study).
That such threats can have a large impact on bargaining outcomes in theory is well
known from the burgeoning field of game theory (see Dixit and Skeath, 1999; Rasmusen, 1994;
and Gintis, 2000 for excellent surveys). Below I will discuss a framework building on this
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theory which we can use to understand such threat effects.
While the data on wage inequality has been widely discussed, data on the distribution
between capital and labor are less well known. Table 2, taken from Poterba (1997) show the
evolution of rates of return on business assets and labor shares in the G-7 countries between 1960
and 1996. In terms of rates of return, many countries exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with returns
falling in the 70's, but going up again in the 80's and 90's, sometimes returning to the heights of
the 60's. Important exceptions to this pattern are Canada, where returns have been higher since
the 80's and Japan, where returns have fallen since the dizzying heights of the 60's and 70's.
The bottom rows of table 2 contain data on labor shares. For the most part, these are the
inverse of the data on returns. Labor shares were higher in the 60's and/or 70's, and have fallen
since that time.
For the United States manufacturing sector, where much of the FDI and outsourcing has
occurred, the decline in labor share is much more dramatic. Table 3 shows the evolution of the
U.S. labor share in manufacturing at selected business cycle peak years. (1997 was not a peak
but it is the latest year for which we have data). Labor share peaked in the 70's, but has been
falling since then. In fact, the share for 1997, 63.6%, is the lowest since the data were collected,
starting in 1948.
To be clear, I am not arguing that globalization in general or threat effects in particular
can single-handedly explain these trends. There are many domestic as well as international
factors at work. I am only arguing that these trends should receive much more attention than they
do, and their evolution is certainly consistent with the notion that there has been a shift in
bargaining power between capital and labor. It is important to understand this shift and the
contribution that capital mobility might be making to it. At this point, this research is underdeveloped.
Research on the impact of capital mobility on taxes and government spending, on the
other hand, is much more advanced than that on capital mobility on income distribution (see
Wilson, 1999 and Hines, 1999 for excellent surveys.) This work, which began at least as far back
as the 1970's and has continued at an accelerating pace since that time, has developed a rich set
of theoretical results which connect lower corporate taxes and altered government spending to
capital mobility. However, strong empirical results even here are still relatively lacking.5
Moreover, most of this work looks at the impact of capital mobility on taxes and
governments in the northern countries. However, bidding for firms has become a global game
and there has been relatively little analysis of the impact of this bidding by poorer countries on
their economies (World Investment Report, 1996, 1999; Crotty, Epstein, Kelly, 1998).
The major difficulty in making progress on the empirical issues is that threats are hard to
measure in a clear way, and as a result, it is difficult to estimate how much of a decline in
wages, or corporate taxes, or changes in the nature of government expenditures and regulations is
due to such threats and how much is due to some other economic phenomenon, such as
technological change. In the absence of information on threats, indirect impacts must be
estimated. Hence, it is thus a major research task to determine how to best measure empirically
the impact of increased capital mobility and threat effects on bargaining relations
5
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The goal of this paper, then, is to discuss how we can analyze theoretically and
empirically the ways in which increased mobility of MNC’s affects bargaining outcomes
between firms and workers, and between firms and governments in their attempts to tax and
regulate firms. A specific focus will be to understand how threats by firms to move – or not to
show up – affect wage rates and employment, unionization drives, tax rates and expenditures,
both in the north and in the south. This paper does not present new empirical results, but rather
attempts to clarify these and suggest a research agenda which can make progress on answering
these questions. Moreover, it can only give a highly selective review of the literature and the
issues in this vast area.
It is important to stress that we have two complementary objectives in trying to reach a
better understanding threat effects: one is to better understand when they are effective and how
big their impacts are; the second is to better understand when they should not be effective, that is
when they are due to bluffs which would not be effective if the workers or governments had
better information about the true likelihood that these threats will be carried out. For it may be
the case, that the threat of capital mobility is having a much bigger negative impact on workers
and governments than it needs to: that is, globalization could be having a big negative effect only
because people mistakenly believe it should! Indeed, many heterodox economists are quite
skeptical that the long long run impact of globalization on the fortunes of governments and
workers is negative (Eg., Gordon, 1995; Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1999; Osterman, 1999)
I should make clear that I have no presumption that globalization in general or threat
effects in particular account for a large portion of increases in inequality, however measured, or
institutional changes such as the decline in unionization in the U.S. This is an empirical question
to which we currently do not have the answer. Indeed, making progress on finding an answer is
precisely the object of this research agenda. I suspect, though, that it may be quite important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a stylized story
and facts to motivate the key issues I will address in the paper. Section III. will discuss some
“canonical” models which have attempted to make more rigorous some of the key notions
involved in a discussion of the impact of openness and threats on bargaining outcomes between
workers and firms. Section IV discusses empirical issues. Section V discusses theoretical and
empirical work on the impact of capital mobility on taxes, and government expenditures. Section
VI briefly discusses a research agenda and section VII summarizes the main results and briefly
discusses policy implications.
II. Capital Mobility, Income Distribution and Social Protection: Two Stylized Stories
There is little doubt that there has been a substantial increase in flows of foreign direct
investment in the world economy. Table 4 shows a fairly dramatic increase in FDI as a share of
capital formation in both developed and developing countries. Of course, these flows are highly
skewed, especially with respect to developing economies, where 10 or so countries get about
70% of the FDI flowing to developing economies.
The reasons for these increased flows are myriad, but the literature stresses two: declines
in transportation costs and the significant advances in communication technologies (see for
example Krugman, 1996 and WIR, various issues.) The significance of a third factor is also
increasingly being recognized: the political decisions by governments in many parts of the globe
5

to alter their laws in order to attract FDI and MNC’s. These changes include lower taxes and
increased subsidies, reductions in government restrictions on investors, and guarantees or
insurance against confiscation of assets. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
while one of the most significant multilateral treaties offering investment protections, is by no
means the only such recent agreement. Over the period, 1991-1996, 95% of the 599 changes in
countries’ regulatory FDI regimes were in the direction of liberalization. “They mostly involved
the opening of industries previously closed to FDI, the streamlining or abolition of approval
procedures and the provision of incentives.” (UNCTAD, (WIR) 1997, p. xviii) The enforcement
structure has also been enhanced by bilateral investment treaties (BIT’s) signed for the protection
and promotion of investment. As of January 1, 1997, there were 1,330 such treaties which
involved 162 countries, a threefold increase in five years. Approximately 180 such treaties were
concluded in 1996 alone (ibid.). The investment protection treaties in the WTO are another
important aspect of this new enforcement regime.
This change in the political regimes governing MNC’s marks a significant decline in
“enforcement” costs, along with declines in transactions and communications costs usually
stressed by economists. (Epstein and Gintis, 1992). These declines in costs have, in principle at
least, significantly increased the exit options of firms wishing to establish operations abroad,
either through FDI, or sub-contracting or other means. What are the impacts of these increased
openness?
There is a burgeoning literature which has tried to understand this increase in openness
on the size and nature of governments. Dani Rodrik (1997) has argued that increased
globalization brings about an increase demand for government protections, because increased
openness to trade and capital flows increases instability in general and also creates an increased
number of losers. Hence there is more need for insurance and redistribution, as well as a need,
more generally, to manage structural change.
However, Rodrik also suggests that increased openness may make it difficult to satisfy
the public’s demands for more social protection. Increased capital mobility may undermine the
ability of governments to collect tax revenue from firms and therefore to provide the public
goods, investments and redistributions desired by the public.
These opposite pressures can be seen as both operating simultaneously: the demand for
more social protection, a la Rodrik, and the race to the bottom, or the willingness of capital to
supply less protection as openness increases. Figure 1 illustrates these in a simple diagram, the
supply and demand for social protection.6The “demand for social protection” is upward sloping,
reflecting the fact that as openness to the international economy increases, citizens and workers
will need more social protections to protect them from the vagaries of the market and the
creation of losers. The “supply of social protection”, represents firms’ willingness to pay taxes to
support government social protections, as well as the willingness firms have to provide social
protections at the firm level, including the toleration of unions, the payment of health benefits,
and other firm level benefits. The line G represents the exogenously given level of globalization.
This represents the exit options facing firms as well as the pressure on firms coming from trade
competition.
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Assume that the economy has been in a stable regime where previous conflicts over the
institutional structure associated with openness have been resolved. Think for example of the
labor-capital accords worked out in the early post-war era –the regime of accumulation in
Boyers’ terms or the social structure of accumulation in Gordon’s has been established. That is
what is meant by an “equilibrium” in Figure 1 where the demand and supply curves intersect.
Now assume there is a shift out in G which represents an exogenous increase in the level
of globalization, that is, an enhancement in the exit options available to firms. As G shifts out, a
wedge develops between the social protection that citizens and workers need, and that which
capital wants to provide. (Figure 1) This sets up a power struggle for institutional change which
could take place at the level of the state or the level of the firm or both. Where the economy
will end up will depend on the relative power of the two groups and the institutional structures in
place and significantly, the level of globalization itself. By enhancing the exit options of firms,
globalization might enhance the power of firms relative to citizens, workers and the state. This
allows them to win a better deal in the struggle for social protection represented by the wedge
between the supply and demand for social protection, moving the economy down in the southeastern direction.
In principle, of course, it could go the other way. Rodrik (1997) shows that there is some
expansion of government as globalization increases. Still, even if that is true, it may still not be
expanding fast enough to keep in line with the possibly more rapid growth in the demand for
protection.
One element of this story is the impact of increased openness on the willingness and
ability of firms to provide (or allow) social protections to its workers, including wages,
insurance, and other benefits. Hence this simple story represents various aspects of the “race to
the bottom” scenario sometimes associated with globalization.
The “race to the bottom” potential problem associated with capital mobility may be
important even if foreign direct investment is between countries or states of the same income
level, and the problems may occur even if investment does not flow at a higher level than
before. The kind of story I have in mind is the following:7
Imagine there are two countries and that in each country there are two “communities” at
least one of which has an excess supply of labor (i.e., unemployment, measured or disguised).
Now assume there are two multinational corporations, one located in each country, so that in
each country there is one community without an MNC. Also, to stack the argument against us,
assume that there is a substantial fixed cost to moving from one locale to another, but that if the
MNC pays that fixed cost, it can close down its operation in one place and move to the other.
Similarly, assume that wages and all other costs, including taxes, and productivity levels, are
initially the same in all four communities. Assume that neither the MNC’s nor the communities
can collude, that the companies want to maximize expected profits and that, initially the
communities want to maximize the sum of total wages accruing to them. For simplicity, the
workers (working and unemployed) are represented by unions.
Now, let’s say that due to a change in norms, or other aspects of the external
environment, the two MNC’s decide to open their location decisions for bidding and tell all four
communities that they are willing to move to the location of the highest bidder. First assume that
7
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the only issue on the table is wages. The communities without MNC’s located in them will put in
a bid low enough to attract the MNC’s, that is, low enough to pay for the fixed costs involved in
moving, as long as the lower wages are above the opportunity costs of the unemployed workers
of taking the jobs (their fall back positions) . Whether it is above the fall-back position will
depend on a host of factors, most notably the level of the fixed cost facing the MNC, the
unemployment benefits and the family structure prevalent in the community (for example,
whether unemployed workers are expected to perform child care within the family and are
compensated for doing so, etc.) The lower the fixed cost, the worse the social safety net, and the
lower the opportunity cost within the family of outside employment, the more likely a bid will be
put in which is low enough to induce MNC movement.
Given that bid, the workers in the communities where the MNC’s are currently located
will have to decide whether to lose their jobs, or take a pay cut to reduce the differential between
their pay and that of the other communities to a level which is less than the fixed cost. If the
opportunity costs of employment are the same in all communities, then they will reduce their
wage offers to close the gap to a level below the fixed costs. Note that their wages will not be
driven all the way down to the offers of the workers in the other communities. They will be
driven down to match the other offers only if there are no fixed costs of moving. In either case,
the MNC’s will not move. There will be no FDI. But there will be a decline in wages induced by
the threat of moving: this is an example of what we have called the “magnification effect”.
In the forgoing analysis, substitute the word “taxes” for “wages” and there will be a
decline in tax rates resulting from the threat of moving, despite the fact that there will be no
movement of capital whatsoever. Note that the existence of the other communities not only cause
a shift down in the demand curve (actually, the bargained wage curve) for labor. They also
increase the elasticity of the curve, making it more difficult to raise wages or taxes. (See Rodrik,
1997).
Now assume that there is an allotment of new investment that each MNC wants to make
and that the cost of the new investment is independent of the locale in which it is placed. Each
MNC will initiate a bidding war and, if the four communities are identical, then the bidding war
will drive down the wages to the opportunity costs of employment in these communities (though
one must take into account that some of the communities already have MNC’s and therefore
their opportunity costs might be different). Assume that the new allotment of investment flows
randomly, since the MNC’s are indifferent to where it goes and therefore it makes no difference
to the outcome whether it goes to one country (net FDI), goes to both countries (no net FDI but
gross FDI) or stays in the home country (neither net nor gross FDI). So, in this case there can be
declines in wages (tax rates) even if there is no net investment but there is gross investment. If
there are agglomeration effects so that it is more profitable to make the new investment where
the old one has already existed, then the wages (or taxes) in the communities where the
investment is currently existing will not be bid down to the same level as at the other countries,
but they will be bid down nonetheless, unless the agglomeration effects are quite large.
Of course, the situation becomes worse for the workers in these two countries if now a
third country opens itself up to investment with all the same characteristics as the first two, but
with lower opportunity costs of employment. Then the FDI will flow away from the the first two
countries to the newly opened country, call it China. But one needn’t have this third country to
get the changes in wages and taxes pointed to above. Note, that if there are risks associated with
FDI and these risks increase with the amount of investment in one locale then even if the third
8

country does open up, not ALL investment will go there, even absent transaction costs.
Finally, look at the countries that have bid for the FDI but have not received any,
because, for example, their productivity levels are too low. They have reduced their tax rates and
wage rates. If this, in turn, lowers tax and wage rates already prevailing in these countries, then
the existence of this bidding process has altered the distribution of income and reduced the level
of public services that the community can afford. In short, bidding can have negative effects
even if no investment comes.
In this story, three factors have contributed toward driving the: First, insufficient
aggregate demand to provide full employment contributed to the outcome. Second, there is a
change in the set of practices of multinational corporations which leads them to alter the way
that they have done business in the past, and put up their location decisions for bidding, while at
the same time being willing to lay off workers, close down plants and move elsewhere to
increase profits. Third, there is an absence of domestic or international rules of the game which
would prevent communities and workers from driving down their own wages and tax rates.
Thus, three factors – inadequate aggregate demand, coercive competition, and weak
domestic and international rules of the game – contribute to these negative impacts in this story.
.
III. Bargaining Models of Capital Mobility, Wages and Income Distribution
III. A. A Simple Nash Bargaining Model
A simple Nash-Bargaining model can offer quite a bit of insight into the impact of increased
openness and exit options on wages, employment and income distribution. (Eg. Blanchflower,
Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Borjas and Ramey, 1994; Rodrik, 1999; these build on Svejnar,
1986). The simplest and and most directly relevant version is due to Rodrik, 1999, which I
reproduce here.
Rodrik considers a small open economy with at least two sectors: one, a competitive sector with
constant costs, where the wage is set at w*, and a second, a rent creating sector, where the
wage(w) is determined in bargaining between workers and firms. The profits of firms is equal to
π . If firms move production abroad, they receive π *. Hence, w* and π * are labors’ and
capital’s outside options or “fall back” positions.
Rodrik adopts a Nash bargaining framework and assumes that the solution to the bargain arises
from the maximization of the Nash product:

(1) max φ log[(u( w ) − u( w*))n] + (1 − φ )log(π − π *)
where φ and 1- φ represent workers’ and firms’ bargaining power, and u(.) represent the utility
workers receive. Assume u’>0 and u’’ <0. n is the employment level in the rent sharing sector
and output in that sector is represented by the production function f(n) with f’>0 and f ’’<0.

9

In that case:

(1)' π = f ( n) − wn
The first order conditions yield the following two equations.
(2) w :

φu©(w )
(1 − φ )n
−
=0
U ( w ) − u( w*) π − π *

f ©(n) − w
φ
+ (1 − φ )
=0
n
π −π *
φ  π − π *
( 4) w ≅ w *
1−φ  n 
dw
(5)
<0
dπ *

(3) n :

One can also show that employment goes down (n) and firm profits go up with an increase in the
availability of firms’ profits abroad.

(6) n =

φ  π −π * 


1 − φ  w − f ©(n) 

dn
<0
dπ *
dπ
dw
dn
= −n
+ [ f ©(n) − w]
(8)
>0
dπ *
dπ *
dπ *
(7)

Rodrik also shows that if there is a downward sloping demand for workers in the competitive
sector than the release of workers from the rent sharing sector can also lower w*, the wages
prevailing elsewhere in the economy.
If there are K rent sharing sectors and if m stands for the number of workers in the competitive
sector than national income Y is given by equation (9). If one assumes full employment and that
workers shed from the rent sector find jobs in the competitive sector, than equation (10) shows
the change in the number of workers in the competitive sector. Equation (11) then shows how
national income changes with an increase in firms’ outside options.

10

(9) Y = wnK + w * m + πK
(10) dm = − Kdn
(11)

dY
dn
= K[ f ©(n) − w*]
dπ *
dπ *

Since dn dπ < 0 , national income falls if f ′(n) > w * , that is, the value marginal product of labor
is greater than the social opportunity cost of labor. Hence if w > f ′(n) > w * then
“globalization” will lead to a deterioration in both income distribution and aggregate income.
In this simple framework, an increase in firms’ outside options, brought on, for example, by a
decline in transportation, communication and/or enforcement costs reduces labors’ share of rents,
the alternative wage, employment, and, possibly, national income. All of this can occur in this
model without an increase in investment abroad.8
The limitations of the Nash bargaining framework are well known: among other things, in many
situations, there may be more than one Nash equilibrium; and the simple framework does not
really describe a plausible process by which any particular equilibrium is reached. If there is
asymmetric information, the difficulties multiply.(See for example Gintis, (2000) for a
discussion). In the Rodrik model, for example, how do workers know that if they do not give
wage concessions that the firm will shut down and move abroad? How do workers tell which
firms are bluffing and which are telling the truth about an improvement in outside options? Note
that this model is most applicable to a situation where there are one way investment flows, say
between a Northern country and a Southern one. But what about the case of two-way flows
between Northern countries, a situation more appropriate to the stylized story discussed above?
B. A Model of 2-way FDI
Several papers have developed bargaining models of two-way FDI (Zhao, 1995; 1998;
Bughin and Vannini, 1994; Naylor and Santoni, 1999.) Building on work by Dowrick (1989) and
others, these models embed firm worker bargaining into an explicit model of oligopoly and
therefore explicitly look at the interaction of rent generation in the product market and
bargaining between workers and capitalists to divide the rents.
Zhao (1995) develops a partial equilibrium bargaining model in which there are two
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countries, two MNC’s, and two unions. Zhao first shows, using the Nash bargaining framework,
that the introduction of a union raises wages and lowers profits. In this environment, firms have
an incentive to carry out FDI, once bariers to FDI are reduced. Zhao assumes a structure in
which each country has one union and the FDI takes place in the same industry in both countries.
(Intra-indusry FDI). The model assumes 2 stages. In the first, MNC(US) invests in Europe and
MNC(E) invests in the U.S. They are both in the same industry. In the second stage, they each
bargain with the union in both countries (the home and the host country).
At the outset one might think the impact on wages and profits are indeterminate. Firms
now have an additional degree of freedom. But now workers have an additional opportunity for
employment. Do these two cancel out and leave wages, employment and profit the same as is
often implied in facile discussion of two way investment? Or do these two-way flows reduce
wages, as implied in the story I told in section II above? (Note that there is an assumption of full
employment, with a union sector and a non-unionized sector in the background). Bargaining
takes place between each national union and the two MNC’s.
Now if there is a strike in one of the countries, the MNC can continue producing in the
other. Moreover, if there is a strike, then world output of the product will decline and the price
and profit accruing to the firm from it plant that is not on strike will go up. Clearly, the firms
outside options have gone up from a situation where if there is a strong, it has no profits.
Zhao(1995) shows that in this situation, workers wages are lower at every level of
employment relative to the situation with no FDI. Employment rises if the union values both
wages and employment, and falls if unions only value employment.
If only one MNC invests, then negotiated wages fall in both countries. The reason is that
the MNC has stronger bargaining power vis a vis both the foreign firm and both unions. Note
that in this case, inward FDI is harmful for the host country union.9
Zhao(1998) develops the model further, taking into account the impact of two-way FDI
on the competitive (non-union) wage. He shows that FDI always reduces the negotiated (union)
wage and it reduces the non-union wage and union employment if the union cares more about
employment than wages or if it is equally concerned about employment and wages.
So far the results support the story told in section II: two-way FDI, by increasing firms’
outside options relative to before (and leaving workers’ outside options the same) reduces
workers’ wages, both in the unionized and, under some conditions, in the non-unionized sector.
Zhao shows that these results must be modified where the union, rather than the firm, is
allowed to “divide and conquer”. In that set-up, firms bargain with each plant separately, but in
each country, there is a country-wide union over-seeing the bargaining. Now the union’s outside
options improve as well: the reason is that if there is a strike, the union workers can get
employed by the other firm in the same country. But the union’s wage is still lower than without
FDI. If there is only plant level unionization and bargaining, then the result is indeterminate. In
principle, unions options could improve by more than firms. But – and this is an important point
not analyzed – if there is unemployment, then even in this case, the unions outside options are
9

Zhao shows that the Nash equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, he shows that, if welfare
is defined as the sum of profits, consumer surplus and union rents, cross FDI increases “world
welfare” if the union is wage oriented, because in that case employment and output goes up, and
reduces ‘welfare’ if unions are employment oriented.
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less likely to improve because rather than getting a job in the other (unionized MNC) they may
be unemployed.
Several other papers present variants of the Zhao models (Naylor and Santoni, 1999;
Bughin and Vannini, 1994). 10 They focus on the FDI decision and show, like Zhao, that outward
FDI can be a response to increased union power in the home country.11 These are important
because they show that firms may use “capital flight” in response to unionization, thereby
altering the incentives workers face when they are considering joining a union. Making the rate
of unionization endogenous to the process of threat effects is developed further in Reddy and
Dube (2000).
These latter models also imply, importantly, that increases in outside options can lead to
an increase in the elasticity of demand for labor (eg. Rodrik, 1997, 1999; Rauch and Trindale,
2000). This may have important empirical implications. (See below).
C. What about threat Effects?
Conspicuously absent from the discussion so far is the term “threat”. This might seem
strange in a paper purportedly about so-called “threat effects”. The reason for its absence,
however, lies in the nature of the bargaining models and solutions present in the papers discussed
so far. The equilibria of these models reflect the impact of changes in outside options on the
character of agreements. There is no discussion of the processes by which these agreements are
reached. Hence, we have no description of the nature of threats, or the absence of them, as
mechanisms for reaching these agreements.
However, the notion of threat is implicit in these models. Indeed, what we have been
describing as outside options are normally described as “threat points” (or sometimes fallback
postiions). For by definition, these bargaining models are structured in such a way that players
can see what their opponent would do if they took certain actions. So, these commonly known
hypothetical actions operate as threats, implicit as they are. Hence, in the cases studied above, if
a group of workers were planning to form a union and bargain for higher wages, and they were
playing the game according to the Nash rules, they would know that if they were to do so, the
firm would invest abroad. Hence, operating under this threat, they would “choose” lower wages
than otherwise. In that sense, the simple models discussed so far do embody “threat effects”.
In more realistic settings –dynamic settings and setting with uncertainty or imperfect
information – “threats” take on more subtle and sometimes more explicit forms. The literature
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Whereas Zhou uses the Nash cooperative bargaining framework (like Rodrik), Naylor
and Santoni derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium in a non-cooperative framework. Whereas
Zhou’s mnc’s produce for export on the world market, Naylor and Santoni’s MNC’s produce for
the domestic markets.
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They are also attracted to countries where there are rents to capture in the product

market.
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on dynamic games with asymmetric information, is huge and complicated. A full discussion of
these issues is way beyond what I can do here, but I will draw on a few of the most relevant
insights in the next section.
D. Threat Effects in Dynamic Models of Imperfect Information
In the situation which I mostly consider here, namely of a multinational corporation and a
set of workers – either unionized or not — or of a firm and a state or local government, the
scenario is likely to be primarily one of asymmetric information with the information stacked on
the side of the firm. The firm knows what its true outside options are much better than do the
workers or the governments. This is partly due to the fact that firms are able to keep a great deal
of information private, whereas firms have a great deal of information on their employees and
governments.
If a firm threatens to move abroad unless it gets wage concessions, how are workers
supposed to evaluate that claim. The literature on game theory stresses the “credibility” of such
claims. Credibility, in turn, is a somewhat slippery concept, and can be difficult to establish: how
will the workers know the firm is not bluffing?
Various strategies for signaling intentions are offered by game theorists. Among these are
establishing reputations for carrying out threats, and undertaking actions which would make it
clearly profitable for the firm to carry out its threat.
In the case of MNC’s, there are clear mechanisms which firms can use to establish
credibility. Having shut down plants and moved operations to another jurisdiction in the past
would certainly satisfy these criteria for establishing credibility. Owning plants abroad or in
another domestic jurisdiction, and making sure the workers knew about it, would also enhance
credibility of threats. The evidence discussed by Bronfenbrenner and presented below show that
firms routinely used these two mechanisms to try to establish the credibility of their threats.
Of course, governments and workers needn’t be totally passive in this process. Game
theorists discuss screening devices which agents can use to try to detect truth tellers from liars
This mechanisms are many and complicated and would need to be included in a full description
of how bargaining takes place in this environment.
As one can see from the complex nature of this issue, one of the major research
challenges is to get more information on how threats operate: when they are credible, when not.
Experiments are one way to sort some of these issues out. More ethnographic studies of actual
bargaining situations between firms and workers and firms and governments will also certainly
be necessary.12
E. The Empirical Implications of the Bargaining Models
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Expanding ethnographic and experimental work is especially important because threats
have complex and different social meanings in different contexts. In some cultures, explicit
threats might not be used. And there is some evidence that in certain contexts, threats actually
have the opposite of the intended effects: they make the desired behavior less likely. I thank Don
Katzner and Sam Bowles for these points.
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The simple model taken from Rodrik (1999) and presented above implies that wages should be a
function of the wage in the “competitive sector” plus a share of the rents which the firm gets over
and above what it could get by investing abroad. The workers’ wage in turn depends on its
relative bargaining power φ .
( 4) w ≅ w * +

φ  π − π *
1−φ  n 

Rodrik’s model also implies that w* should fall in an economy with flexible wages, or where
there are barriers to labor adjustment, unemployment should rise. Zhao’s models imply that the
effect on w* or unemployment should depend on the degree to which workers bargain for both
wages and employment.
Whereas Rodrik’s model literally implies that no investment need take place, the models
of Zhao implies that firms’ bargaining power will be enhanced when firms have invested abroad;
the discussion of credible threats also implies that owning (or sub-contracting with) factories
abroad will enhance the credibility of threats in more complicated games.13
These models also imply that demand for labor should become more wage elastic as
capital mobility increases: as outside options abroad improve. Econometric work would need to
estimate π * , the outside option, w*, the workers’ alternative wages, conditioned on firms or
industries that have stocks of investment in other jurisdictions, their contracting relations and
outsourcing possibilities.. Ideally, one would want to use firm level data to control for workers’
and firm level characteristics. However, firm level data for the U.S. with worker characteristics
are very difficult to come by for the U.S.
In addition to econometric work, much can be learned from surveys and ethnographic
research. Unfortunately, the only study along these lines of which I am aware is by
Bronfenbrenner, which is quite informative. I discuss her study at length, below.
IV. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Capital Mobility on Wages and Employment
A. Some Stylized Facts on U.S. MNC’s
To place the following discussion in context, Table 5 presents some basic facts about the
operations of U.S. based MNC’s derived from Burke, 1999. First, in general, U.S. MNC
operations have grown modestly between 1977 and 1994, as measured by sales and employment.
By 1994, affiliate net income reached more than 35% of MNC income and affiliate employment
reached 31% of total affiliate employment. The shares in developing countries also rose, with
affiliate employment in developing countries reaching 34% of affiliate employment by 1994.
The share of affiliate income attributed to developing countries grew quite dramatically between
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This discussion does not take into account the subtleties associated with sub-contracting
which does not necessarily involve FDI, but which can nonetheless have similar effects on wage
bargaining. Empirically, it is very important to take into account such sub-contracting
arrangements.
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1977 and 1994 from 14 percent overall to 27%. This of course may be at least partly due to tax
avoidance strategies (see below). Wages in developing countries are only a fraction of those the
MNC pays in the U.S. Overall, productivity levels in foreign affiliates have grown to 88% of that
of parents, though we don’t have separate data on productivity levels in the developing country
affiliates. Finally, the developing country share of affiliate sales to the U.S. market have grown
quite dramatically from 8.6% in 1977 to 21.7% in 1994.
Hence, the relative importance of foreign operations for U.S. mnc’s has grown, and in
particular the importance of affiliates in developing countries. The data indicate a big increase in
the share of income coming from foreign affiliates, which perhaps proxies for an increase in
π *, the outside option in the Rodrik model.
B. Direct Evidence on Threat Effects
The only direct study of threat effects on wages that I am aware of is the important and
fascinating study by Bronfenbrenner (1996) and related work by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich.
Bronfenbrenner undertook a study of union certification campaigns and first contract
negotiations, between 1993-1995. The study involved surveys and follow up telephone
interviews with lead union organizers and negotiators.14 Through this process, Bronfenbrenner
was able to gather a great deal of information about the nature of threats: how they were
delivered, whether they were carried out, and which firms tended to make them.
In the United States, it is illegal to explicitly and unambiguously threaten to shut down a
plant to thwart a unionization drive. As Bronfenbrenner’s data show, however, this did not stop
firms from making threats – both quite explicit and even written – and often verbal and implicit.
Bronfenbrenner shows that “plant closing threats are an extremely pervasive and effective
component of employer anti-union strategies”. According to her findings, employers threatened
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Her study was based on a random sample of 600 union certification elections and 400
cases where the petition to hold an election were withdrawn. The samples were drawn from the
entire National Labor Relations Board universe of cases with 50 or more employees which took
place between 1993-1995. Lead organizers in the campaigns were mailed surveys asking them a
series of questions about worker and firm characteristics, employer tactics during the campaign,
including questions about plant closings the threat of plant closings. For all of the elections in the
sample where the union won the election, a follow-up questionnaire was sent to the union
representative responsible for the first contract campaign to collect addtional data on employer
behavior during the first contract process. Follow-up phone interviews were conducted where
plant closings or the threat of plant closings were reported by organizers and/or union
representatives to have played a role in the withdrawal, election or first contract process. In these
interviews orgnizers were asked detailed questions about the nature of the plant closing threats,
how the threats were carried out, the frequency of the threats and the availability of any
documentary evidence. In addition, data base searches were conducted to collect company
ownership and revenue data for all firms where threats were made or plants were
closed.(Bronfenbrenner, pp. 6-7)
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to close the plant in 50 per cent of all elections and 52 percent of all withdrawls. In another 18
percent of the campaigns, the employer threatened to close the plant during the first contract
campaign after the election was won. The employer went on to close the plant in 12 percent of
the units where the union won the election.(p. 9) (See table 6, below)
These overall percentages mask some substantial variation across industries. There is
some evidence that a higher percentage of threats are made in industries where the plants are
actually more likely to be mobile. For example, threats occured in only 25 percent of health care
industy units and 27 percent of retail industry campaigns; but they ocurred in 65% of
manufacturing units and 50 percent of transportation units. Bronfenbrenner makes a rough break
down of “mobile” industries vs. “immobile” ones and find that threats to shut down the plant
were made in 62% of the mobile units, compared with 36% of the immobile units.15(p. 9)
Bronfenrenner notes that: “Thus, where employers can credibly threaten to shut down
and/or move their operations in response to union activity, they do so in large numbers.” (P. 10)
Since making direct, unambiguous threats during an organizing drive is strictly illegal,
most threats were somewhat indirect, or veiled, made orally, often in one to one meetings.
Reports Bronfenbrenner, “In our follow-up interviews...we learned that specific unambigous
threats ranged from attaching shipping labels to equipment throughout the plant with a Mexican
address, to posting maps of North America with an arrow pointing from the current plant site to
Mexico, to a letter directly stating the company will have to shut down if the union wins the
election.”16
Firms making threats used many subtle and not-so subtle tactics to try to make their
threats credible. One company provided statistics in a captive audience meeting on the average
wage of a Mexican auto worker, the average wage of their U.S. counterparts and how much the
company stood to gain from moving to Mexico. (P. 12)
Ambiguous verbal and written threats tended to focus on examples of union facilities that
had closed down. For example, some companies showed footage of closed plants to their
employees in captive meetings; others provided data on the number of union plants that had
closed in the past. Firms with plants elsewhere made sure that the workers knew about their
existence.
These threats seemed to make a difference to the outcome.The union election win rate
was lower in units where plant closing threats occurred (33%) compared to an overall win rate of
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Mobile industries include manufacturing, sites, storage and warehouse facilities as well
as some transportation and service units. Immobile industries include heath care, construction,
hotel and restaurant and entertainment facilities and most communication and service units.
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Bronfenbrenner reports that more than 10% of the organizers said the employer
directly threatened to move to Mexico....the most blatant example was an automotive company
where the company parked thirteen flat-bed tractor trailers... in front of the plant for the duration
of the whole campaign, with signs which read “Mexico Transfer Job”. They were loaded with
equipment that came from a production line they had closed down over the weekend without
warning. The same company also flew employees from their Mexican facility to videotape the
workers on a production line which the supervisor claimed they were “considering moving to
Mexico”. (p. 11).
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40%; putting threats in writing seemed to make them more effective. The win rate where they
were put in writing was only 25% compared to 37% with veiled threats.17
Bronfenbrenner also investigated the characteristics of the firms to identify which types
of firms were more likely to make threats. She asked whether they were profit or non-profit,
whether they were U.S. based multinationals, whether they were foreign based multinationals,
whether they had factories in other countries, and whether they had suppliers from other
countries.
Some 39% of the companies in the sample had other sites or locations in Mexico, Canada
or other countries, and 49% had a trading relationship either as suppliers or as customers with
companies operating in foreign countries.
Interestingly, election win rates were much lower in companies with Mexican (31
percent) or Asian, African and Australian locations (26%)or in those which have trading
relationships with other countries (30-33%) than the overall win rate of 40%.(p. 17) The threat
rates by U.S. companies with foreign sites were equal to the overall threat rates. Bronfenbrenner
hypothesizes that, “This may be because simply the existence of other sites...or a trading
relatoinship...serves as an unspoken threat of plant closing for many workers.” (P. 18).
Threat rates themselves were highest for foreign owned multinational companies,
especially with those based in Asia, Africa and Australia where threat rates for withdrawals was
100%, and 75% for elections. U.S. based multinational plants had threat rates that were only
43% for withdrawals and 52% for elections, slightly higher than the overall rate for
elections,(50%) and slightly lower than the overall rate for withdrawals (52%). Theses rates for
U.S. based multinationals are lower than those for overall manufacturing firms (at least 60%).
Table 6, derived from Bronfenbrenner,(1996) summarizes some key results: Threats were
made more often in mobile industries such as manufacturing, than in immobile industries, such
as health. Where threats were made with higher frequency, it appears that elections were less
likely to win than when threats were made less frequently. In short, mobility seems to matter for
threats; and threats seem to matter for elections and other outcomes.. Also note that mobility
seems to matter for outcomes, even not taking into account threats: the win rate was much lower
in mobile industries than in immobile ones. The implicit threats associated with mobility seems
to have an impact as well.
Contrary Evidence
There is contrary evidence to that implied in Bronfenbrenner’s work. Golden (1999),
using a new data set on labor relations in the OECD, reports empirical evidence that union power
is still alive and well in many countries in the OECD. There is no evidence in her data set that
“globalization” has undermined workers’ institutions, brought about a general convergence in
labor institutions. It will be crucial to sort out the reasons for the differences in Golden’s
findings, and Bronfenbrenner’s.
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Bronfenbrenner does not report standard errors so one doesn’t know if these differences
are statistically significant.
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C. Econometric Work
The most direct econometric estimate of the impact of threats on bargaining power comes
from Svejnar (Svejnar, 1986). The key result from Svejnar is that exogenous changes in the
environment be shown empirically to have an impact on bargaining power of firms and workers.
Wage and price controls, for example, are seen in Svejnar’s study to have a negative impact on
workers’ bargaining power and wages. But he does not explicitly test any globalization variables.
His work could easily be extended in this direction if plant level data were available.
MNC Behavior and Shifts in Labor Demand
A fair amount of research has tried to assess whether increased FDI has led to less
employment in the home country. The results of this research are quite mixed with the clearest
evidence coming from firm level data. For the United States, Lipsey(1999) finds that there has
been almost no aggregate shift of employment or production to foreign countries, since
continuing shifts to foreign locations by U.S. manufacturing firms have ben largely offset by
shifts into the United States by foreign multinationals.
But, significantly, Lipsey does find that higher levels of production in developing
counries by a firm are associated with lower employment at home for a given level of
production. The reasons is that U.S. multinationals tend to allocate their more labor-intensive
production to developing country affiliates and retain more capital and skill intensive operations
in the U.S.
Other studies using disaggregated – usually firm level – data find similar results. For
example, Fors and Kokko (1999) find that Swedish MNC’s also seem to be substituting foreign
for domestic labor, with home operations probably becoming less labor intensive. These findings
contradict earlier studies of Sweden that used more aggregative data (eg. Lipsey, Ramstatter,
Blomstrom, 1999).
D. Outsourcing and Bargaining Power
Part of the problem with studies of capital mobility by MNC’s is that it has focused on
FDI. But as discussed previously, MNC’s operate in many ways, not just through FDI: they use
sub-contracting, joint ventures, and outsourcing.
Among the most interesting work in this area has been initiated by the efforts of Feenstra
and Hanson, who have created measures of outsourcing and have looked at outsourcing’s impact
on wage inequality and the distribution of income between profits and wages in the U.S. (See
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997; Feenstra, 1997). Feenstra and Hanson define outsourcing as
the importation of intermediate products, from foreign affiliates, sub-contractors, or other firms.
Table 7, derived from Feenstra 1998, present estimates of outsourcing in Canada, Japan,
the UK and the US, from 1974 to 1993. The data exhibit a general and quite large increase in
outsourcing for these countries over this period.
Focusing on the U.S., Feensra and Hanson (1997) note that oursourcing has increased
substantially within the U.S. manufacturing sector, at an annual rate of .2% over the period,
1979-1990. At the same time, while the production wage share declined substantially during the
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1979-1990 period (at an annual rate of .15%) , and the non-production wage share has only
slightly increased, the capital share increased by an average rate of .25% a year over the period
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997, Table 2). They argue that these changes are the result of an
imprecisely measured combination of outsourcing and technological change.
There is some evidence that outsourcing is having similar impacts in the U.K. Anderton
and Brenton (1999) looked at the impact of outsourcing in two industries where low skill
workers are prevalent: textiles and non-electrical machinery production. They find that
outsourcing to low wage countries seems to have had a significant negative impact on low
skilled workers in these industries.
Slaughter’s work on Wage Elasticities
Perhaps the most suggestive empirical work on these issues is in Slaughter (1998).
Slaughter exploits the idea that increased potential capital mobility and threat effects can lead to
an increased wage elasticity of demand for labor.
Slaughter estimated the changes in wage elasticities in U.S. manufacturing from 1960 to
1990. He combined data into eight clusters of industries.18 Slaughter finds that the wage
elasticity of demand for production labor falls over time in five out of the eight industries as the
globalization theory would predict19 . Slaughter then tried to determine the causes of the decline
in elasticities in these industries. He included many of the globalization variables which we have
discussed: these include outsourcing, foreign affiliate share of US MNC assets, and affiliate
share of U.S. MNC employment.
Slaughter found that outsourcing had a large impact on the decline in labor demand
elasticities facing these industries. This seems like strong evidence consistent with the threat
effects story. However, the statistical significance of these variables mostly disappear when
Slaughter put in time as a variable in his regression equation.
Slaughter discusses his mixed results: “One major problem with the trade measures might
be that it is not actual trade that matters but potential trade. That is what might matter for labor
demand is just the ability to transact internationally regardless of whether such transactions
actually occur”. Speaking about the effect the time variable had on the globalization variables,
Slaughter notes: “..perhaps trade’s true effect s to increase its “threat” over time – both in terms
of product market competitiveness and factor substitutability – independent of actual changes in
econometric observables. This might be a reason to attribute time’s explanatory power to trade.
On the other hand, perhaps computerization’s true effect is a similar “threat” independent of
whether computers are actually used. In this case perhaps time should be attributed to
technology. It is not obvious how to distinguish these alternatives.”
Hence, while Slaughter’s results are highly suggestive, they still do not provide the
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The industries are: food and tobacco; Textiles, Apparel and Footwear; lumber furniture,
paper and printing; chemicals, petroleum, and rubber; stone, clay glass and transportation
products; primary metals and fabricated metals; nonelectrical machinery and electrical
machinery; instruments and miscellaneous products.
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In only chemicals, machinery and lumber do elasticities not fall.
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“smoking gun” of threat effects one might be looking for. And they point out the diffiulties of
assessing threat effects without more direct information on the nature and existence of these
threats.
V. The Impact of Capital Mobility, Threats and Bidding on Capital Taxation
Research on the relationship between capital mobility, inter-jurisdictional tax competition
and public policy is much more advanced than that on wages and labor-capital relations.20
Starting in the 1970's, Oates (1972) began the development of a canonical model of interjursidictional tax competition. As Oates put it: “The result of tax competition may well be a
tendency toward less than efficient levels of output of local services. In an attempt to keep taxes
low to attract business investment, local officials may hold spending below those levels for
which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particularly for those programs that do not offer
direct benefits to local business” (Oates, 1972, p. 143, as quoted in Wilson (1999). While Oates
focused on federalism, the same argument can be readily applied to issues of international
taxation (Avi-Yonah, 1996; Wilson, 1999). This view departed from the Tiebout model which
argued that taxes and spending would efficiently reflect tax and spending preferences of
individuals, allowing them to sort themselves into communities with the optimal level of taxation
and spending for each community. The new literature which built on Oates’ insights noted
various externatlities which tax competition would impose, thereby making bidding for tax bases
to be inefficient, and lead to the under provision of crucial public goods.
There seems to be considerable evidence that international capital mobility is driving
down taxes on a global basis. Rodrik (1997), for example, using data for 18 OECD countries,
finds that capital tax rates fall and labor tax rates go up as trade openness increases (P 63-64).
This of course is not an ideal test since we are concerned with mobility of capital and not trade.
A visual inspection of turning points, though, indicate that capital tax rates begin falling in many
of these countries in the 1980's and tax rates on labor begin to rise at around the same time; this
is clearly the time when capital mobility increased as well. Without further study it is, of course,
impossible to tell how much of this may be due to capital mobility, though Tanzi (1993, 1999)
suggests that capital mobility is an important culprit. (See also (Avi-Yonah, 1998).
For the United States, for example, there has been a dramatic decline in the corporate tax
burden in recent years, from an average of 64% in the 1970's to 42% in the 1990-1996 period
(Poterba, 1997, Table 2).
Hines reports that multinational corporate production gives enormous opportunities to
reduce tax burdens through such mechanisms as income shifting and transfer pricing (Hines,
1996; 1999). Says Hines, “One clear implication of the quantitative evidence is that the
investment, financing and other activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to
their tax treatment. This sensitivity carries numerous implications for tax policy, including the
standard for governments to compete with each other to offer firms ever-lower tax rates to attract
activities that are believed to be beneficial to their economies. An alternative to tax competition
is to form supranational agreements to harmonize tax rates and tax bases; but such attempts are
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notoriously innefective and quickly abandoned.”21 Other studies have shown that for U.S.
MNC's, that reported rates of return and profit margins are higher in low-tax countries than in
high tax countries, which is what one would predict if companies were to shift reported income
to reduce their tax liabilities. Studies have has also shown that U.S. companies that had
subsidiaries in low-tax countries had lower overall U.S. tax ratios than U.S. companies with
subsidiaries in high-tax countries (Grubert and Slemrod, 1994; Tanzi, 1993, p. 103).
The "War Between the States", as the competition among US states for investment and
jobs has come to be called, may well be a microcosm of what is emerging in the global arena.
Subsidies cost local governments tens of billions of dollars in lost tax revenue, yet as the
willingness to offer such concessions becomes universal, they have less and less effect on plant
location decisions. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis called for a federal law prohibiting
state and local tax incentives for particular companies as an attempt to reduce this destructive
war. (See Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1996; Holmes, 1995)
Perhaps the most interesting piece of evidence along these lines comes from an
interesting study by Figlio and Blongen (1999). They show that inward FDI in South Carolina
lead to higher wages and employment there, but it also led to a shift in county expenditures
away from education spending toward infrastructure. This a clear indication of bidding effects
for foreign direct investment. More studies like this are clearly needed.
This competition is spreading more widely to the South as well. Though many countries
make large and costly changes in their economies and government policies to attract FDI, few
actually attract much. In addition to removing barriers to inward capital flows, governments
attempt to entice FDI with a variety of investment incentives. However, the empirical literature
suggests that investment incentives have not been effective in attracting direct investment flows.
Instead, this literature has identified market size as the dominant influence on direct investment
inflows (WIR, 1999). Despite and perhaps due to their pervasiveness, tax holidays do not seem
to lure direct investment. Moreover, even if flows arrive they may not benefit the domestic
economy especially if, because of liberalization agreements themselves which lock governments’
hands, they cannot regulate the MNC’s in the community’s interest (WIR, 1999)
As Wilson and Davies (2000) point out, however, these studies beg the question of what
is the optimal rate of taxation. In recent years, economists have begun to question the canonical
models of inefficient tax competition. Many have argued that, in the absence of tax competition,
taxation might be too high. So tax competition actually brings taxes down to their efficient
levels. These arguments, like those for destructive competition, rest on claims about externalities,
or rent seeking governments. These issues clearly remain to be sorted out.
I am skeptical, however, that the tax competition revisionists will win the day. The
evidence developed by Hines (1999) and others indicates a clear and substantial ability of capital
to avoid taxes in the new era of capital mobility. This implies a dramatic shifting of the tax
burden on to fixed factors, such as labor. The efficiency arguments for this are based on models
which assume that inequality has no harmful effects. New research indicates this is unlikely to be
true in general. And it fails to adequately consider important equity issues. The standard response
of redistributing income or wealth to restore equitable distributions are much more difficult to
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Note that not all aspects of globalization reduce tax rates on capital. Hines (1996)
reports examples where transfer pricing can increase tax revenue for the United States.
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accomplish in economies with mobile capital. Hence, the standard compensation principles of
welfare economics on which these models rely are becoming virtually irrelevant in the face of
high levels of capital mobility.
There is important counter evidence to these trends. (See Golden, 1999 for a summary of
some of this). Some authors have found that mobility has not undermined the welfare state.
Hence, while in theory, perfect capital mobility might do so, capital maystill not sufficiently
mobile to have “accomplished” this. (Epstein and Gintis, 1992). These issues surely remain to be
sorted out.
VI. Toward a Research Agenda on Threat Effects
Identifying and measuring the impacts of international integration through the threat
channel will require a great deal more work and ingenuity. The limitations of current data sets
are severe. Among the biggest problems is the lack of good data on the myriad activities of
MNC’s and the ways in which governments and unions interact with them, not only in the
United States, but also abroad. If the “outside option” is a central variable of any threat model,
then having much better data on the value of this option is crucial. To do so we need much better
data on:sub-contracting relationships, including wages and productivity levels, government tax
breaks and subsidies, and better information on out-sourcing relationships. Second, we need
better data on services. The service industry is growing rapidly, but much of our data are for
manufacturing, a shrinking sector in most rich countries.
In addition to data improvements, we need much more information on how threats work
in a context of imperfect information: for example, how are bluffs distinguished from credible
threats? How do workers and governments try to improve their information when faced with a
threat? Can threats actually be counterproductive? Experiments may help sort out some of these
issues.
Perhaps more importantly, we need more intense survey and interview work of the type
conducted by Kate Bronfenbrenner and her collaborator Tom Juravich. More work along these
lines will be crucial to creating an understanding of how threats operate, how effective they are,
and how big an impact can they have.
In short, better data, more survey and ethnographic research, and better overall
information on the activities of multinational corporations, especially their sub-contracting and
outsourcing behavior, are essential to making significant progress on these issues.
VII. Conclusion
Globalization is a complex and contradictory process which is surely having myriad
impacts, some undoubtedly for good, some surely for ill. No one process – including capital
mobility and threat effects – can fully explain any aspect of globalization, for example the
increase in inequality. But capital mobility has surely been under-studied, especially relative to
trade, and I believe it is crucial that this imbalance be corrected if we are to better understand the
impact of currently existing globalization. Threat effects are certainly one, but only one, channel
by which capital mobility can effect the economy. While I believe it potentially has a large
effect, we currently have very little idea of how big it is.
Even though we need to do much more work on identifying the impact of capital mobility
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and threats, it is still worthwhile to briefly explore the policy implications if it were to turn out
that capital mobility does have significant deleterious effects. As we argued in Crotty, Epstein
and Kelly (1998) and Braunstein and Epstein (1999) policies at the domestic, regional and
international levels would all be necessary to correct the imbalance caused by high capital
mobility between capitalists, on the one hand, and communities and labor, on the other. Among
the policies we advocated are: full employment macroeconomic policy, to enhance the
bargaining power of both workers and communities; international tax treaties to limit
international tax competition; enhancement enforcement of labor rights so that threats cannot so
easily be applied; change in IMF/World Bank policies that require countries to open up to FDI in
order to quality for loans. These are just a few of the many important policy changes that would
be required to deal with the possible negative impacts of capital mobility.
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Figure 1
Demand for and Supply of Social Protection

Social
Pr otection
G0
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➯

Demand

}
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workers and citizens from firms and the state
capital supplies at firm level and to the state

Source: Braunstein and Epstein (1999)

25

Table 1
Regional Distribution of Inward and Outward FDI Stock, 1985 and 1997
(Percentage)
Inward FDI Stock

Outward FDI Stock

Region/Country

1985

1997

1985

1997

Developed Countries

72.3

68.0

95.7

90.2

Developing Countries

27.7

30.2

4.3

9.7

Africa

3.1

1.9

.9

.5

Latin America and the
Caribbean

10.1

10.9

1.1

1.0

.1

.1

-

-

14.3

17.2

2.3

8.2

West Asia

-

.2

.3

.3

Central Asia

-

.2

-

-

South, East and SouthEast Asia

8.6

15.3

2.0

7.9

The Pacific

.2

.1

-

-

Central and Eastern
Europe

-

1.8

-

.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Developing Europe
Asia

World

Source: World Investment Report, 1998. Table 1.3
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Table 2
Rates of Return and Labor Shares in G-7 Countries, 1960-1996
Date

U.S.

Germany

France

Italy

Canada

U.K.

Japan

G-7
Average

Comparative Rates of Return on Business Assets, G-7 Nations, 1966-1996

1960-69

14.2

15.8

12.5

15.6

12.7

11.9

25.3

15.4

1970-79

14.2

13.7

12.8

12.8

15.6

10.2

17.8

13.9

1980-89

15.3

12.2

11.9

13.1

19.0

9.6

14.1

13.6

1990-96

17.9

13.8

14.8

15.0

18.5

10.9

14.7

15.1

.7

.7

.7

.9

.1.1

.7

1.3

S.D.

Labor Shares of Business Sector Output, G-7 Nations, 1966-1995

1960-69

67.3

62.5

69.2

62

70.3

69.5

57.5

65.5

1970-79

67.7

66.1

69.0

65.4

64.5

69.9

66.3

67

1980-89

66.7

65.9

67.8

63.5

62.4

69.2

68.3

66.3

1990-95

66.2

63.5

61.6

61.0

65.6

70.9

65.3

64.9

.9

1.1

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.5

1.4

S.D.

Source: Poterba, 1997.
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Table 3
Labor Share in U.S. Manufacturing
Selected Business Cycle Peak Years
1953-1997
Business Cycle
Peak Year

Labor Share of
Manufacturing Gross
Product

1953

67.9

1960

69.8

1973

71.3

1980

74.6

1990

66.8

1997*

63.6

Source: BEA, Gross Product By Industry, www.bea.doc.gov
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Table 4
The ratio of foreign-direct-investment inflows and outflows to gross fixed capital formation

19811985

19861990

19911995

Memo:1997

All Economies

4.4

8.8

8.7

15.7

Developed Economies

4.9

11.3

9.0

16.2

Western Europe

6.9

14.6

13.6

25.0

Developing Economies

4.7

4.4

9.2

14.2

Latin America

4.3

5.1

10.0

18.6

Asia

3.4

4.1

9.2

12.9

S.E. Asia

2.2

5.0

10.7

14.0

Developing Economies
5.2
4.8
9.2
14.0
minus China
Source: UNCTAD, 1995,1997, 1999 World Investment Report, Annex table B5.
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Table 5
U.S. MNC Operations, 1997 and 1994
U.S. MNC Operations (all industries)

1977

1994

Affiliate Sales as Share of MNC sales

21.2

29

Affiliate Employment as Share of MNC employment

26.6

31.6

Affiliate Net Income as Share of MNC income

21.4

35.3

Affiliate Sales in Dev. Countries as Share of MNC Sales

15.3

17.8

Aff. Employment in Dev. Countries as Share of Aff.
Empl

28

34

Dev Country Share of total For Aff net income

14

27.2

Machinery

7.3

31.9

Electrical Equipment

20.7

33.2

Transport

4.7

32.5

Developed Countries

.71

.90

Developing Countries

.26

.29

.74

.88

9.1

14

Developed Countries

9.2

12.1

Developing Countries

8.6

21.7

Ratio of average compensation in for. Affiliate to average
compensation in parent operations

Ratio of Foreign Affiliate Labor Productivity to parent
labor productivity
Foreign Affiliate Sales to U.S. Market as a share of Total
Affiliate Sales
All Industries

Source: James Burke, 1999.
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Table 6
Industrial Sector Threats and Election Outcomes
All
Campaigns

Elections

Percent
Threat
Rate

Win
Rate for
Elections

Win Rate for
Elections with
Threats

Threat
Rate

Manufacturing

.65

.27

.24

.64

Transportation

.50

.52

.48

.52

Health

.25

.61

.54

.27

Mobile

.62

.28

.23

.60

Immobile

.36

.55

.51

.39

Industrial Sector

Source: Bronfenbrenner, 1996, Table 4, p. 39.
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Table 7
Outsourcing in Selected Countries, 1974, 1984 and 1993

Country

1974

1984

1993

Canada

15.9

14.4

20.2

Japan

8.2

7.3

4.1

UK

13.4

19.0

21.6

US

4.1

6.2

8.2

Canada

9.0

8.8

15.1

Japan

5.2

4.8

2.6

UK

13.1

20.6

22.5

US

3.0

4.5

6.3

Canada

17.7

21.9

26.6

Japan

2.1

1.9

1.8

UK

16.1

24.9

31.3

US

4.1

7.2

11.0

Canada

13.2

17.1

30.9

Japan

3.1

3.4

2.9

UK

14.9

23.6

34.6

US

4.5

6.7

11.6

Canada

29.1

37.0

49.7

Japan

1.8

2.4

2.8

UK

14.3

25.0

32.2

US

6.4

10.7

15.7

All Manufacturing

Chemical and Allied Products

Industrial Machinery
(Non-electrical)

Electrical Equipment and Machinery

Transportation Equipment

Source: Feenstra (1997); Note: U.S. Estimates are for 1975, 1985, and 1995.
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